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COMMENTS 
TAKING THE TRAINING WHEELS OFF MLS: 
WHY THE SINGLE ENTITY ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION SHOULD NO LONGER APPLY 
TYLER A. COPPAGE* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Soccer is the most popular sport in the world.1  In American history, how-
ever, the sport has struggled to carve out a sustainable niche in a sports-
saturated culture.2  In 1996, Major League Soccer (MLS) set out to change all 
that in its inaugural season.3  A mere seventeen years later, MLS has nearly 
doubled in size and is flourishing.4  With such growth naturally comes an in-
creased level of scrutiny on all fronts.  This Comment will examine the 
league’s susceptibility to an antitrust challenge in the time since MLS’s single 
entity exemption was first challenged in Fraser v. Major League Soccer.  
More specifically, this Comment will use the high-profile transfers of Clint 
Dempsey, Michael Bradley, and Jermain Defoe to illustrate how current MLS 
roster rules, including the limited free agency added in 2015, potentially vio-
late federal antitrust law. 
To begin this pursuit, Part II provides a brief history of soccer in America 
and a more in-depth account of the history of MLS, including developments in 
*The author received his J.D. from Marquette University Law School in 2015 and his B.A. in
Government from the University of Virginia in 2012.  He would like to thank his family and fellow 
editors for being reliable sounding boards throughout this process. 
1. E.g., The World’s Most Popular Sport is Soccer/Football, TOPEND SPORTS,
http://www.topendsports.com/world/lists/popular-sport/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
2. See, e.g., AM. SOCCER HIST. ARCHIVES, http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/ (last updated
Mar. 28, 2015). 
3. See generally 1996 Season Recap, MLS SOCCER, 
http://www.mlssoccer.com/history/season/1996 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
4. See 2012 Season Recap, MLS SOCCER, http://www.mlssoccer.com/history/season/2012 (last
visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
COPPAGE ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/15  9:45 AM 
546 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 25:2 
MLS since Fraser was decided in 2002.  Part III focuses on the development 
of antitrust law in the sports realm and how the law governs Major League 
Soccer—specifically, how MLS gained a single entity exemption from anti-
trust litigation.  Part IV goes on to discuss the transfer of Clint Dempsey from 
Tottenham to Seattle Sounders, the transfer of Michael Bradley from AS Ro-
ma to Toronto FC, and the transfer of Jermain Defoe from Tottenham to To-
ronto FC as a means of establishing a lens through which the issue can be 
viewed.  Part V analyzes how the changes in both the MLS and antitrust law 
will require a court to eliminate the single entity antitrust exemption MLS cur-
rently enjoys.  Part V will then go on to discuss the future of MLS and how 
changes are necessary for the league to become a global force in the sport, es-
pecially in light of New York City Football Club, the result of a partnership 
between Manchester City and the New York Yankees.  Specifically, legisla-
tion mirroring the Union of European Football Associations’ (UEFA) Finan-
cial Fair Play might be necessary in America if the league is to legally achieve 
the competitive balance MLS desires. 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The history of soccer in America is tumultuous, characterized by brevity 
and failure.5  Although the focus of this Comment is on MLS, this account 
must also include a brief discussion of the North American Soccer League and 
how Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) used the 1994 
World Cup to breathe life into soccer in America.6  Understanding the histori-
cal underpinnings behind MLS ultimately being successful provides insight 
into why roster rules, like a salary cap, were adopted in the first place.  All 
success stories build from lessons learned in failure, and MLS is no different. 
A.  Historical Underpinnings 
Many recognize England as the birthplace of modern soccer, or football as 
it is known in the rest of the world.7  In America, however, Pasuckuakohowog 
(a game played by Native Americans) may have at least helped to give rise to 
the game known as soccer today.8  Literally, the word is translated to mean, 
                                                
5. See e.g., AM. SOCCER HIST. ARCHIVES, supra note 2. 
6. See Randy Harvey, U.S.’s Bid for 1994 World Cup Comes to Head, L.A. TIMES (July 4, 1988), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-04/sports/sp-3978_1_world-cup.  
7 E.g., Julie-Ann Amos, The History of Soccer ⎯ Over 2000 Years of Sporting Evolution, 
THEHISTORYOF (June 17, 2008), http://www.thehistoryof.net/the-history-of-soccer.html. 
8. The American Indians and Pasuckuakohowog, HIST. OF FOOTBALL REALLY (Sept. 28, 2009 
4:11 AM), http://historyoffootballreally.blogspot.com/2009/09/american-indians-and-
pasuckuakohowog.html [hereinafter Pasuckuakohowog]. 
COPPAGE ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/15  9:45 AM 
2015]      SINGLE ENTITY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN MLS  547 
“they gather to play ball with the foot.”9  Unlike the game today where flop-
ping (or diving) has reached near-epidemic levels,10 Pasuckuakohowog was 
extremely violent and was sometimes played with up to 500 players on each 
side.11  It is difficult to imagine that the sport known as soccer evolved from 
such violent beginnings, but “the beautiful game” no doubt has interesting 
roots.12  Jump forward a few hundred years, and America finally took the first 
steps toward establishing a professional league.13  
Like other sports in America, soccer was largely an amateur endeavor un-
til technology evolved and allowed nationwide competition to be possible.14  
As evidenced by the number of failed leagues and the fact that MLS did not 
take off until 1996, soccer is still a budding professional sport in America 
when compared with the titans that are Major League Baseball (MLB), the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Football League 
(NFL).15  Of these major leagues, the NBA is the youngest, formed in 1946.16  
In comparison, the major leagues in the United States dwarf MLS’s eighteen-
year existence.  In light of this information, it is perhaps not surprising that 
any attempt at forming a professional league was largely unsuccessful. 
Somewhat surprisingly, England’s successful professional soccer league in 
the late 19th century was based on the structure provided by professional 
baseball in the United States.17  The league was popular in England, so the 
next logical step was to try it out in America, where urban centers contained 
large foreign populations.18  America’s first attempt at a professional soccer 
league came in 1894.19  Unfortunately, the American League of Professional 
                                                
9. Id. 
10. See Laura Williamson & Dominic King, Diving is the Cancer of Football and We Must Stamp 
Out, Says FIFA Chief, DAILY MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-
2215289/FIFA-chief-Diving-cancer-football.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2012). 
11. Pasuckuakohowog, supra note 8. 
12. See, e.g., Sean Wilsey, The Beautiful Game: Why Soccer Rules the World, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (June 2006), available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2006/06/soccer/soccer-text. 
13. Steve Holroyd, The First Professional Soccer League in the United States: The American 
League of Professional Football (1894), AM. SOCCER HIST. ARCHIVES, 
http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/alpf.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2000). 
14. See, e.g., id. 
15. See, e.g., History of Major League Baseball, PEOPLE HIST., 
http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/baseballhistory.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
16. See NBA Seasons Recaps, NBA (July 1, 2014), http://www.nba.com/history/nba-season-
recaps/index.html. 
17. Holroyd, supra note 13. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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Football (ALPF) experiment failed, and the league folded before one full sea-
son was completed.20  Plagued by lackadaisical ownership and poor attend-
ance, the league was not sustainable, and perhaps as a product of the general 
attitude toward professional sports at the time, it took many years before any-
one learned from these mistakes on a national scale.21  For example, the Saint 
Louis Soccer League functioned from 1907–1939, but as the name might indi-
cate, the league was restricted to the Saint Louis area, perhaps indicating a dif-
ficulty in taking a league nation-wide.22 
In the time since the ALPF folded, there have been no fewer than thirty-
three failed professional soccer leagues in America.23  The most interesting of 
those leagues was the North American Soccer League (NASL).24  The NASL 
began in earnest in 1968 after the United Soccer Association and National Pro-
fessional Soccer League merged to form one, reputable league.25 The NASL 
was able to attract global soccer icons like Pelé, Franz Beckenbauer, and Jo-
han Cruyff, just to name a few.26  For a brief period in time, the focal point of 
world soccer was on the United States, but it failed to lay a successful founda-
tion for soccer in this country.27  Poor organization and a lack of business ac-
umen in operation led to the NASL declining just as rapidly as it came to 
prominence.28  However, this failure in particular might have been the most 
instructive for the eventual founders of Major League Soccer.  For example, 
the carefree spending of NASL clubs and the subsequent failure probably 
made the salary cap system the MLS uses that much more attractive.29 
The missteps of the NASL are worth mentioning, if for no other reason 
than for the staggering proportion of mistakes.  When the league started to 
stare failure in the face in 1980, teams were spending, on average, 70% of 
their revenue on player salary.30  If the average team was spending 70%, the 
                                                
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See David Litterer, St. Louis Soccer League (SLSL) - 1907-1939, AM. SOCCER HIST. 
ARCHIVES, http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/slsl.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2002). 
23. See generally AM. SOCCER HIST. ARCHIVES, supra note 2. 
24. See David Litterer, North American Soccer League I (NASL) 1967-1984, AM. SOCCER HIST. 
ARCHIVES, http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/nasl/naslhist.html#HISTORY (last updated Mar. 8, 
2008). 
25. Id. 
26. Clive Gammon, The NASL: It’s Alive but on Death Row, SI (May 7, 1984), 
http://www.si.com/vault/1984/05/07/626590/the-nasl-its-alive-but-on-death-row. 
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., id. 
29. See, e.g., id. 
30. J.D. Reed, It’s Time for Trimming Sails in the NASL, SI (Dec. 1, 1980), available at 
http://www.si.com/vault/1980/12/01/825203/its-time-for-trimming-sails-in-the-nasl-three-franchises-
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Cosmos were making a mockery of financial responsibility, paying the likes of 
Johan Cryuff $500,000 per year.31  These spending habits, coupled with a 
stagnant economy, yielded a $30 million deficit for the league.32  By 1985, the 
league was left with only two teams willing to take the field.33  While there 
was optimism that play would resume in 1986, the plan never came to fruition, 
and the NASL closed up shop for good.34 
B.  Birth of Major League Soccer 
With the exception of the NASL, which was something of a supernova,35 
MLS has been the only world-class, sustainable soccer league in American 
history.36  The inaugural season of MLS was in 1996, and the league contained 
ten teams.37  These ten teams each selected sixteen players in a draft and the 
rest is history.38  MLS Cup ’96 ended in a thrilling contest, with D.C. United 
overcoming the L.A. Galaxy in the final.39  The first season seemed to be at 
least a modest success. 
The next staple year in MLS history came in 2007 when the L.A. Galaxy 
signed global soccer icon David Beckham.40  Not only did MLS announce that 
Beckham would be slated to earn $250 million over five years, the introduc-
tion of the Designated Player Rule allowed Beckham to be signed in the first 
place.41  While the deal was lucrative for David Beckham, his former club Re-
                                                                                                                 
are-on-the-verge-of-going-under-as-the-league-grapples-with-the-effects-of-overexpansion-the-
recession-and-union-troubles. 
31. Compare id., with John Leptich, Birkenmeier’s Goal is to Help Save Soccer, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 
8, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-09-08/sports/8502280932_1_sting-north-american-
soccer-league-goalkeeper-victor-nogueira (reporting Hubert Birkenmeier’s salary to be $160,000 per 
year with the Cosmos). 
32. Reed, supra note 30. 
33. Associated Press, NASL Suspends Operations for 1985, Maybe Forever, VICTORIA 
ADVOCATE, Mar. 28, 1985, at B4. 
34. Litterer, supra note 24. 
35. Compare Reed, supra note 30, with Leptich, supra note 31 (reporting Hubert Birkenmeier’s 
salary to be $160,000 per year with the Cosmos). 
36. See David Litterer, Major League Soccer (1996-Present), AM. SOCCER HIST. ARCHIVES, 
http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/mls.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2011). 
37. 1996 Season Recap, supra note 3. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. 2007 Season Recap, MLS SOCCER, http://www.mlssoccer.com/history/season/2007 (last visit-
ed Apr. 18, 2015). 
41. Robert M. Bernhard, MLS’ Designated Player Rule: Has David Beckham Single-Handedly 
Destroyed Major League Soccer’s Single Entity Antitrust Defense?, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 413, 
426 (2008).  This salary figure can be qualified by the fact that it quantifies Beckham’s potential earn-
ings over the five-year period from both salary and endorsements.  Kurt Badenhausen, David Beck-
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al Madrid missed out, as the Galaxy paid no transfer fee; in other words, Ma-
drid received no financial compensation for losing Beckham.42  While this 
seems inconsequential because it happens regularly in world soccer, it is criti-
cally important for the purposes of the antitrust discussion this Comment will 
undertake in Part V. 
 David Beckham began his professional playing career at Manchester 
United, one of the most prestigious clubs in the world.43  From there, Beckham 
moved to Real Madrid, the most successful club in the history of European 
soccer.44  His third career move was to the L.A. Galaxy, a transfer that shocked 
the sports world.45  Rarely does a player move from such prestige to a relative-
ly unknown club while they still have value left for top-tier clubs.46  This 
transfer was perhaps a signal that MLS was beginning to be a player in global 
soccer.  Although Beckham was not in his prime at the time of the transfer, it 
was still a bold move to play in a lesser league.  To better understand this wa-
tershed moment, it is helpful to look at the league’s rules. 
C.  MLS Roster Rules  
MLS rules require each team to adhere to a salary cap; in 2014, the figure 
was $3,100,000.47  The Designated Player Rule is a rule that allows teams to 
use two roster spots to exceed the salary cap because those two salaries only 
count against the cap up to $368,750 for players over twenty-three years of 
age.48  These spots can be used on younger players, only counting against the 
cap for roughly $150,000 each.49  This mechanism allowed David Beckham to 
                                                                                                                 
ham Departs MLS After Earning $255 Million, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2012/11/30/david-beckham-departs-mls-after-earning-
255-million/. 
42. David Beckham – Transfer History, TRANSFERMARKT, http://www.transfermarkt.com/david-
beckham/transfers/spieler/3139 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Beckham Transfers]. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.; Manuel Traquete, World Football: The 11 Most Successful European Clubs in History, 
BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 5, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/510011-world-football-the-11-
most-successful-european-clubs-in-history/page/12. 
45. Beckham Transfers, supra note 42. 
46. See, e.g., Andrea Pirlo – Transfer History, TRANSFERMARKT, 
http://www.transfermarkt.com/en/andrea-pirlo/transfers/spieler/5817 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015) 
(showing that Pirlo, a world-class player in a similar position, went to Juventus at around the same 
age Beckham went to Los Angeles). 
47. Roster Rules and Regulations, PRESS BOX, http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/roster-rules-
and-regulations (2014) [hereinafter MLS Rules] (current rules also allow for a third designated player 
spot to be purchased). 
48. See id. 
49. Id. 
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earn such a large amount while the Galaxy stayed within the league-mandated 
salary cap.50  Going forward, the Designated Player Rule and any potential ex-
pansions to the rule will attempt to allow MLS teams to attract more talented 
players while still striving for competitive balance.51   
Allocation is another mechanism within MLS roster rules to ensure an 
even playing field.52  The allocation process dictates that MLS teams will be 
positioned in an allocation order in accordance with their performance the pre-
vious year, the least successful clubs ranking at the top of the list.53  This pro-
cess is in place for occasions when a U.S. National Team player or former 
MLS player returns from playing abroad.54  When a team successfully claims a 
player through the allocation process, it is placed at the bottom of the alloca-
tion order.55  
III.  LEGAL HISTORY 
Beginning with Copperweld, moving to Fraser, and finally to American 
Needle, this part of the Comment will provide a look at how MLS gained sin-
gle entity exemption from antitrust litigation.  Critically, the Supreme Court in 
American Needle might have set precedent that could undermine how the sin-
gle entity exemption applies. 
A.  Antitrust Background 
The Sherman Antitrust Act bluntly states that “every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”56  Put more simply, any concerted action that unreasonably restrains 
interstate trade or commerce is illegal under antitrust law.  Likewise, the Clay-
ton Act is “an Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints 
and monopolies.”57  These Acts are the foundation of antitrust law in America, 
and therefore, antitrust cases are often brought under these statutes.58 
As a defense to antitrust litigation, leagues have often tried to assert a sin-
                                                
50. See Bernhard, supra note 41, at 425–26. 
51. See id. at 425–27. 
52. See MLS Rules, supra note 47. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012). 
57. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (2012).  
58. See generally The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
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gle entity defense.59  A single entity defense, at bottom, is when a league 
claims to be one, unified entity incapable of conspiring to restrain trade in vio-
lation of antitrust law.60  At issue in single entity cases is the notion that the 
leagues themselves are not actually engaged in concerted action, that the 
league and all of the teams produce a single product.61  While the Fraser deci-
sion infra serves to show that courts sometimes apply single entity status, 
many federal appellate courts do not adopt a similar stance.62   
The next step is to unpack what qualifies as an “unreasonable” restraint on 
interstate commerce for antitrust purposes. The level of cooperation necessary 
would most likely be in violation of antitrust law in other contexts.63  To re-
solve this dilemma, rule of reason analysis is the appropriate test because pro-
fessional sports require off-field cooperation to create on-field competition.64 
Generally speaking, rule of reason analysis begins with the plaintiff showing 
that an agreement had a substantially anticompetitive effect.65  Then, the de-
fendant must prove the competitive advantages achieved by the conduct in 
question.66  The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the con-
duct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s legitimate objec-
tive or that the end can be achieved by less restrictive means.67  Ultimately 
then, the court weighs the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects and 
makes a determination68 
Applying this framework to a potential claim against MLS, a plaintiff 
would first attempt to show anticompetitive effects of MLS rules regarding 
player movement and salaries.  For example, a player could show that three 
players on a roster, the Clint Dempsey-types of the world, have uninhibited 
earning power; they earn what the market dictates.  However, for the other 
twenty players on a roster that are limited by the salary cap, they cannot earn 
what they could in an unrestricted market.69  In turn, MLS then has the oppor-
                                                
59. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 630 (2013). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 413. 
62. Id. at 414. 
63. See id. 
64. Id. at 422. 
65. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See generally MLS PLAYERS UNION, 2013 MLS PLAYER SALARIES: SEPTEMBER 15, 2013: 
ALPHABETICAL, available at 
http://www.mlsplayers.org/files/September%2015,%202013%20Salary%20Information%20-
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tunity to show that the anticompetitive effects are necessary.  In the time of 
Fraser, the justification of competitive balance might have been applicable.  A 
court might also have been lenient in light of the struggles the league faced.  
Today, however, with three Designated Player spots and players of significant-
ly different talent levels entering the league, these same justifications might 
not hold up. 
Following the MLS showing that the restrictions are necessary, the plain-
tiff then has the opportunity to show that there are less restrictive means to 
achieve the same goal.70  In this case, there may well be less restrictive means 
to achieve competitive balance.  The survival of the league is not in question 
and other leagues around the world function without a salary cap.71  This 
would lead a court to make the ultimate determination as to whether the pro-
competitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects.  If the anticompeti-
tive effects prevail, the league’s practices cannot stand.72  In a MLS context, if 
the restrictions from the league are anticompetitive and have no real 
pro-competitive justification, the restriction will be declared illegal. 
When approaching an antitrust problem, a court must also determine the 
relevant market as well as market power within it.73  For antitrust purposes, the 
relevant market includes product market and geographical market.74  While 
geographical market is the physical area being considered, the product market 
describes the groups of producers of similar products that have the ability to 
take business away from one another.75  After the proper market is determined, 
a court must then decide if the party being accused of an antitrust violation has 
the requisite power in that market to actually restrain commerce.76  Some case 
law can better illustrate these antitrust principles. 
                                                                                                                 
%20Alphabetical.pdf . 
70. See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL 
ANALYSIS 8 (Federal Judicial Center 1981). 
71. See, e.g., Dayn Perry, No, Baseball (Still) Doesn’t Need a Salary Cap, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 5, 
2013), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-baseball/24350073/no-baseball-still-doesnt-need-a-
salary-cap. 
72. See generally, e.g., L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). 
73. Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 
72 CAL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1984). 
74. MITTEN, supra note 59, at 432–33 (citing L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football 
League, 726 F.2d 1381). 
75. Id. 
76. See id. 
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B.  Copperweld 
One of the first relevant cases in deciphering antitrust law and its applica-
tion to MLS is Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.77  In Copper-
weld, the petitioner purchased Regal Tube Co. from Lear Siegler, Inc.78  In the 
purchase agreement, Lear Siegler agreed not to compete with the petitioner for 
five years following the sale.79  A subsidiary of Lear Siegler subsequently 
competed with Regal, only to have the petitioner warn them to cease.80  The 
respondent filed this suit, alleging a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman An-
titrust Act.81  The Supreme Court held that a parent company and their subsid-
iary were not capable of conspiring for purposes of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
because they were the same entity.82  This holding provided the foundation 
upon which the court made its decision in the soccer-specific case Fraser v. 
Major League Soccer.83 
C.  Fraser 
Moving to the realm of soccer, Fraser involved a group of players suing 
the league and the operator/investors for agreeing not to compete for player 
services and for monopolizing player services, otherwise preventing another 
entity from being a top-tier league in America.84  The court relied heavily on 
the notion that the appellant failed to prove that MLS had significant power 
over the relevant market, i.e. global soccer.85  Based on this failure, the court 
affirmed the lower court and granted Major League Soccer single entity im-
munity from antitrust litigation, treating the league as a parent company and 
the teams as subsidiaries, as discussed in Copperweld.86  By deciding the case 
in this way, the court acquiesced to the idea that MLS is a single entity, effec-
tively allowing the league to escape liability under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  
This case deserves more discussion because it is the only case thus far that 
discusses antitrust in a soccer context.  It is notable that the court used the 
                                                
77. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
78. Id.  
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 756–57. 
81. Id. at 757–58. 
82. See id. at 777. 
83. See generally 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). 
84. Id. at 54–55. 
85. E.g., id. at 55. 
86. See id. at 71. 
COPPAGE ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/15  9:45 AM 
2015]      SINGLE ENTITY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN MLS  555 
market power test to arrive at the conclusion, not finding it necessary to en-
gage in a full rule of reason analysis as courts in other cases involving sports 
issues have done.87  The court specifically held that Fraser failed to prove the 
relevant market.88  As MLS continues to grow, such a showing might not be as 
difficult because the market is quite simply global soccer.89  Continued, sus-
tained growth in MLS and more talent in the league would mean that the 
league has a strong enough foothold in world soccer to no longer need legal 
protection from antitrust litigation.  The bells may be chiming just about now, 
as the arrival of Dempsey, Bradley, and Defoe signal at least a small leak from 
across the pond. 
D.  American Needle 
More recently, the Supreme Court explicitly opened the door to challeng-
ing single entity exemptions granted to sports leagues.  In American Needle, 
Inc. v. National Football League, the thirty-two teams that comprise the NFL 
came together to form National Football League Properties (NFLP).90  The pe-
titioner in the case had a non-exclusive license agreement with the NFLP, but 
it was not renewed.91  When the NFLP signed an exclusive agreement with 
Reebok, the petitioners filed suit alleging an antitrust violation.92  The Court 
unanimously decided to not extend single entity immunity, using a nut and 
bolt as an example.93  While the nut and the bolt must go together to function 
in the end, the factories producing the two parts must still be subject to anti-
trust litigation.94 
The American Needle decision could be critical for any legal challenges to 
MLS’s single entity exemption moving forward, and because the Supreme 
Court decided this case, leagues with exemptions have a lot less wiggle room 
within the once-comforting antitrust protection.  Although American Needle 
dealt with licensing for products and merchandise, the holding could potential-
ly serve to create far more stringent requirements for determining what unity 
                                                
87. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 
(1984). 
88. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 71. 
89. See Joe Prince-Wright, MLS Ranked Seventh Best Soccer League Globally . . . Can it Break 
into the Top Five?, PROSOCCERTALK (April 23, 2013), 
http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2013/04/23/mls-ranked-seventh-best-soccer-league-globally-can-
it-break-into-the-top-five/.  
90. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 185–87 (2010).  
91. Id. at 187. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 199. 
94. Id. 
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of interest means in a league governance context. 
IV.  CLINT DEMPSEY, MICHAEL BRADLEY, & JERMAIN DEFOE 
A recent, high profile example of MLS rules coming into play and poten-
tially implicating antitrust law was Clint Dempsey’s move from Tottenham, an 
English Premier League team, to the Seattle Sounders in MLS.95  What was 
particularly interesting about that move was that MLS, not the Sounders, paid 
the transfer fee, differentiating it from the Beckham deal.96  Prior to Demp-
sey’s move to Seattle, the team was second in the allocation rankings behind 
the Portland Timbers, meaning the Timbers actually had first option to sign 
him.97  While the roster rules allow for teams to move up the allocation order 
by compensating the teams above them,98 there is no indication that Portland 
received any compensation when Seattle leapfrogged them in the order.99  This 
combination of factors seems to unveil a problematic hole in MLS rules and 
provides a lens through which MLS can be viewed for antitrust purposes to-
day. 
Compared to Beckham, Clint Dempsey took a drastically different path to 
become one of the most expensive MLS players ever.  Born and raised in Tex-
as,100 Dempsey came up through MLS and moved to Fulham in the English 
Premier League, a more prestigious league than MLS.101  After a fantastic sea-
son at Fulham in 2010–11, Dempsey moved to Tottenham, one of the most re-
spected clubs in the league.102  While not on the level of his teammate Gareth 
Bale, Dempsey was a solid rotation player on a top-tier squad.  In light of the-
se developments, moving back to MLS with Seattle was slightly bizarre.103   
Even more recently, Clint Dempsey’s countryman Michael Bradley made 
                                                
95. See, e.g., Doug McIntyre, Spurs Announce Clint Dempsey Move, ESPN FC (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://espnfc.com/news/story/_/id/1512434/clint-dempsey-join-seattle-sounders-tottenham-sources-
say?cc=5901. 
96. Grant Wahl, How Seattle’s Stunning Clint Dempsey Deal Got Done, SI (Aug. 5, 2013)., 
http://www.si.com/soccer/2013/08/05/clint-dempsey-seattle-sounders-mls . 
97. MLS Allocation Rankings, MLS SOCCER, http://www.mlssoccer.com/allocation (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2015). 
98. MLS Rules, supra note 47. 
99. William Conwell, If Clint Dempsey Signs with the Sounders, What Do the Timbers Get?, 
STUMPTOWN FOOTY (Aug. 2, 2013 5:11 PM), http://www.stumptownfooty.com/2013/8/2/4584038/if-
clint-dempsey-signs-with-the-sounders-what-do-the-timbers-get. 
100. Clint Dempsey, ESPN FC, http://espnfc.com/player/_/id/39928/clinton-dempsey?cc=5901 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Wahl, supra note 95. 
COPPAGE ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/15  9:45 AM 
2015]      SINGLE ENTITY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN MLS  557 
a move from AS Roma in Italy to Toronto FC in MLS while in the prime of 
his career, which has puzzled many soccer enthusiasts.104  To make it happen, 
MLS, not Toronto, paid a reported $10 million to AS Roma.105  Joining Brad-
ley in Toronto will be Jermain Defoe, a long-time striker for Tottenham in the 
English Premier League and a well-known player for the England National 
Team.106  All three of these transfers illustrate the fact that MLS, not teams, 
pay for player transfers.107  So long as MLS remains a single entity for antitrust 
purposes following Fraser, the fact that the league pays the transfer fee is in-
consequential.  In practice though, competitive balance is ruined while MLS 
power in the market for soccer players globally continues to grow. 
The story of MLS changed dramatically with the introduction of David 
Beckham, and that legacy is felt today by the likes of Clint Dempsey and Mi-
chael Bradley as they make the mega-money moves back to MLS.  However, 
the fact that Dempsey is a returning American makes a difference as to how 
the roster rules are applied.108  Michael Bradley's situation is an ongoing ex-
ample that could prove to be even more controversial.  The stories of Dempsey 
and Bradley are continuing to unfold but provide excellent illustrations of how 
the MLS rules are limiting players earning ability in violation of the law.  Fur-
ther, players are disproportionately being disadvantaged because only a maxi-
mum of three players on a given roster have uncapped earning ability.  Previ-
ously, MLS may not have had the requisite power in the global soccer market 
for this issue to raise real concern.  Today though, the likes of Clint Dempsey, 
Michael Bradley, and Jermain Defoe have changed this assumption. 
V.  SOLUTION OR PREDICTION 
Using the history of MLS and the legal history of antitrust in soccer, one 
logical conclusion arises: MLS should no longer be exempt from antitrust liti-
gation under the single entity defense.  As MLS continues to grow and become 
more viable globally, the league may no longer need the single entity defense 
to protect itself.  FIFA continues to push MLS to adopt a European model of 
                                                
104. Frank Isola, Michael Bradley’s Move to MLS Team Toronto FC Is a Head-Scratcher, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/soccer/isola-bradley-move-mls-
head-scratcher-article-1.1577369. 
105. Nick Firchau, Serie A Side AS Roma Say Michael Bradley Sold to Major League Soccer for 
Record Fee, MLS SOCCER (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.mlssoccer.com/news/article/2014/01/09/report-serie-side-roma-say-michael-bradley-sold-
major-league-soccer-record-f. 
106. Jermain Defoe: Tottenham Striker to Join MLS Side Toronto, BBC SPORT (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/25680333. 
107. See, e.g., Wahl, supra note 95. 
108. See MLS Rules, supra note 47. 
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soccer leagues and doing so could perhaps allow the league to avoid the con-
sequences of losing immunity in another suit along the lines of Fraser.  Fur-
thermore, the introduction of New York City Football Club also introduces 
Manchester City to MLS and creates the potential for more unequal footing.   
A.  Recent Change 
Since MLS was granted single entity immunity in Fraser, the league has 
undergone some major changes in structure.  One of the most glaring is own-
ership.  When MLS began in 1996, the league devised an operator-investor 
scheme to remedy the problems that riddled the NASL.109  Under this plan, in-
vestors would provide a certain amount of money for portions of expenses 
while MLS itself would pay for the rest.110  At the outset, only six opera-
tor-investors controlled the ten teams.111  More recently, however, there has 
been an influx of wealthy investors, bringing an unprecedented level of stabil-
ity to MLS.112  This notion is given added weight by the fact that the league is 
still expanding while remaining financially stable.113  Globally, soccer clubs 
turning a profit is almost unheard of, so for MLS to continue to receive prefer-
ential legal treatment by way of the single entity immunity could be a stretch 
going forward.114   For the league itself, an incentive to change is non-existent 
because teams turn profits and attract better players.  This, however, is the ba-
sis for antitrust scrutiny: when concerted actors manipulate commerce to have 
their cake and eat it too. 
The next, and perhaps more serious change in relation to the single entity 
immunity is the expansion of the Designated Player Rule.  When David Beck-
ham came to MLS in 2007, a team was only allowed to have one Designated 
Player.115  The 2010 collective bargaining agreement changed the rule,116 al-
                                                
109. Bernhard, supra note 41, at 414. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. See also, e.g., Major League Soccer Announces New York Expansion Team: New York 
City Football Club, MLS SOCCER (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.mlssoccer.com/news/article/2013/05/21/major-league-soccer-announces-new-york-
expansion-team-new-york-city-football [hereinafter MLS Announces NYCFC]. 
113. Mike Pesca, Major League Soccer Finally on Solid Footing, But Hasn’t Reached Big Time, 
NPR (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/01/173271245/major-league-soccer-finally-on-
solid-footing-but-hasnt-reached-big-time. 
114. See, e.g., SIMON KUPER & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, SOCCERNOMICS 6 (Nation Books, 2d ed. 
2012). 
115. See Joshua Mayers, Major League Soccer Adds Second DP Slot, Can Purchase a Third 
(League Release), SEATTLE TIMES NEWSPAPER (April 1, 2010 8:38 AM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/soundersfcblog/2011498898_major_league_soccer_adds_secon.html#co
ntinue. 
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lowing two Designated Players per roster and permitting each club to buy a 
third.117  This expansion seems to inch MLS that much closer to the Europe-
an-style, which allows free player movement via the transfer process.118  This 
undoubtedly gives MLS more power over the global market for soccer players, 
which would change the reasoning the court relied upon in Fraser.119  The ef-
fects of the original Designated Player Rule are present in MLS today, as 
players such as Thierry Henry, Tim Cahill, Landon Donovan, and Robbie 
Keane have all moved to MLS as Designated Players.120  While these players 
are in the latter stages of their careers, they are nonetheless world-famous 
players that competed at the highest level of European competition at one time 
or another.121  The trend will likely continue as current superstars such as Cris-
tiano Ronaldo have expressed their desire to play in America one day.122 
This development seems to indicate that the MLS has a more powerful 
presence in the global market for soccer players.  No longer does the league 
need legal protection in order to remain viable, and the way in which Clint 
Dempsey moved back to the MLS illustrates the need for MLS to be proactive.  
Elsewhere in the world, teams with the financial resources available can at-
tempt to sign another player.  The recent transfer of Radamel Falcao illustrates 
this principle.123  Falcao moved to AS Monaco, a French club, while Spanish 
and English giants failed in their pursuits.124  In the case of Dempsey, Seattle 
did not pay the transfer fee; MLS paid it.125  This behavior would seemingly 
                                                                                                                 
116. Although this implicates the antitrust labor exemptions, an issue beyond the scope of this 
Comment, this example illustrates the way in which player movement in MLS changed in the time 
since Fraser.  Jeffrey Marcus, M.L.S. Expands Designated Player Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://goal.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/m-l-s-expands-designated-player-rule/?_r=0. 
117. Mayers, supra note 114. 
118. See In Soccer, What is a Transfer and How Does it Work?, EXPLAINING SOCCER (July 1, 
2009), http://explainingsoccer.typepad.com/explaining-soccer/2009/07/in-soccer-what-is-a-transfer-
and-how-does-it-work.html. 
119. See Fraser, 284 F.3d at 55. 
120. Designated Players, MLS PRESS BOX (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/designated-players. 
121. See, e.g., Thierry Henry, TRANSFERMARKT, http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en/thierry-
henry/transfers/spieler/3207 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
122. Ronaldo: I Hope to Play in MLS, ESPN FC (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://espnfc.com/news/story/_/id/1129968/cristiano-ronaldo:-i-hope-to-play-in-mls-one-
day?cc=5901 [hereinafter Ronaldo]. 
123. Tim Poole, Why is £50m Super Striker Falcao Snubbing Real, United and Co. for Lowly 
Monaco (with a Crowd Lower than Luton’s…)?, DAILY MAIL ONLINE, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2333257/Why-Radamel-Falcao-joining-Monaco-
Manchester-United-Real-Madrid-co.html (last updated May 30, 2013). 
124. Id. 
125. Wahl, supra note 95. 
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not be tolerated if the league did not enjoy the single entity exemption.  Seeing 
that the court in Fraser relied on the lack of market power,126 and MLS is en-
joying a greater influence in the global market,127 trouble could be on the hori-
zon. 
In light of American Needle, that trouble could rear its ugly head as soon 
as another player files suit alleging an antitrust violation.  MLS should not 
have a free pass to engage in concerted action that limits interstate trade.  The 
court in Fraser showed a general leniency and deference, perhaps because the 
league might not have survived to tell about it if antitrust scrutiny applied to 
the rules a decade ago.128  Presently, such deference is not necessary.  Having 
the league pay transfer fees for the likes of Clint Dempsey and Michael Brad-
ley functions as if a company is assigning an employee to a franchise.  Practi-
cally speaking, this model does not work well in a sports context because as 
talent in the league increases, competitive balance will actually decrease.  This 
is due to the league being able to pick and choose where the stars go.129  There 
does not appear to be anything in place to prevent MLS from assigning mar-
quee names to New York and Los Angeles, the largest and most popular mar-
kets, exclusively when the influx occurs.  Antitrust law is the proper tool to 
prevent that action. 
The most recent, and perhaps most damning, evidence of the fact that 
MLS should not be considered a single entity for antitrust purposes is the lim-
ited free agency provision in the 2015 MLS collective bargaining agreement 
(MLS CBA).  Heading into negotiations, MLS players vowed to reject any of-
fers that did not include free agency.130  The provision they received grants 
players at least twenty-eight years old that have eight years of MLS experience 
free agency.131  MLS still places a cap on how much money the player can 
earn if they enter free agency,132 but the critical takeaway for antitrust purposes 
is that MLS teams will now directly compete with one another for free agent 
services.  This flies in the face of MLS being considered a single entity be-
cause, as the Court wrote in American Needle, a nut and a bolt need one an-
                                                
126. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 55. 
127. See, e.g., Ronaldo, supra note 121. 
128. See generally 284 F.3d 47. 
129. See Standings: 2013 Regular Season, MLSSOCCER, 
http://www.mlssoccer.com/standings/2013 (last updated Apr. 18, 2015) (showing Seattle as a playoff 
team the year before Dempsey joined the squad). 
130. Richard Sandomir, MLS and Union Reach Deal Giving Free Agency to Veterans, NY TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/sports/soccer/mls-and-union-reach-deal-giving-
free-agency-to-veterans.html?_r=0. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
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other to be useful, but the factories producing the two products are not a single 
entity.133  MLS teams competing for player services off the field need one an-
other for competition on the field, but like all other major professional leagues 
in America, antitrust scrutiny must apply because at the most basic level, this 
is an illustration of economic competitors agreeing to restrain trade.  
Major League Soccer could also attempt to solve the problem itself by 
adopting a European model of league governance.  In Europe, the major 
leagues are in action from August until late spring.134  Instead of a playoff sys-
tem, the European system calls for a table of promotion and relegation to be 
used.135  Adopting this schedule and system would allow players to flow more 
freely from Europe to America and vice versa.  As presently constituted 
though, MLS roster rules create a real roadblock to that free movement.  Go-
ing forward, two options standout—adopt the European model or lose the sin-
gle entity immunity in a subsequent legal challenge. 
B.  Financial Fair Play 
The UEFA Financial Fair Play is legislation applicable to teams in the ju-
risdiction of UEFA, or Europe.136  The structure of FIFA is to govern globally 
while member confederations govern more locally on their respective conti-
nents.137  UEFA governs Europe and consequently the most successful club 
teams in world soccer.138  Financial Fair Play is intended to cap transfer ex-
penditures in any given transfer window.139  With oil tycoons and royal fami-
lies purchasing club teams, there has been a recent influx of unabashed spend-
                                                
133. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. at 199. 
134. See, e.g., 2013/14 Barclays Premier League Scores & Fixtures, ESPN FC, 
http://www.espnfc.com/barclays-premier-league/23/scores?date=20130817 (last visited Apr. 18, 
2015). 
135. E.g., 2014/15 Serie A Table, ESPN FC, http://www.espnfc.com/italian-serie-a/12/table (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
136. Financial Fair Play, UEFA, http://www.uefa.org/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-
financial-fair-play/index.html/ (last updated Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter FFP].  The FFP standards are 
in place to (1) introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; (2) to decrease pres-
sure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary effect; (3) to encourage clubs to compete 
with(in) their revenues; (4) to encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and infrastructure; 
(5) to protect the long-term viability of European club football; and (6) to ensure clubs settle their 
liabilities on a timely basis.  Id. 
137. Confederations, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/confederations/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
138. UEFA Member Associations, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
139. See FFP, supra note 136. 
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ing, which many believe hurts the game.140  The MLS salary cap system pre-
vents this sort of spending on some level, but the three Designated Player 
Spots allow teams to spend freely on three players, and Toronto FC recently 
spent quite a hefty sum of money on Jermain Defoe and Michael Bradley.   
Although the positive effects of Financial Fair Play have yet to be seen, a 
similar policy might soon be necessary in America with MLS.  With continued 
expansion, more valuable television rights, and the allure of American culture, 
the day may soon arrive when the Cristiano Ronaldo-type player wants to play 
in America during his prime.141  When that day arrives, MLS must be ready for 
the implications it brings for competitive balance.  Without question, trying to 
achieve that balance while remaining competitive globally is incredibly chal-
lenging.  
C.  Globalization 
The beginning of this globalization process has already begun for MLS.  
New York City Football Club (NYCFC) entering MLS in 2015 has already 
changed the landscape of the league.142  Most glaringly, Manchester City is a 
partner in the ownership group and has taken to promoting the team with the 
world-class players that play for their squad.143  In fact, rumors have already 
begun to swirl about potential marquee signings for the club in its inaugural 
season.144  MLS roster rules will apply to them, just as any other team; howev-
er, the loan system that is prevalent in world soccer might present a new issue.  
Manchester City could theoretically transfer a player in and then loan them to 
NYCFC, using the club as a minor league team of sorts.  While this is mere 
speculation at this point, that behavior would create a sort of competitive im-
balance that a salary cap could not hope to cure.  Single entity antitrust im-
munity would be for naught. 
                                                
140. See, e.g., Arab Group Agrees Man City Deal, BBC SPORT, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_city/7591735.stm (last updated Sept. 1, 2008). 
141. See, e.g., Ronaldo, supra note 122 (illustrating that the desire to play in America already ex-
ists for some of the best players). 
142. See, e.g., Frank Lampard Finally Signs MLS Contract to Play with NYCFC, ESPN FC (Jan. 
10, 2015), http://www.espnfc.us/story/2237691/frank-lampard-finally-signs-mls-contract-to-play-
with-nycfc. 
143. See, e.g., Paul Nicholson, City Boost Their NYCFC Presence Using Player Assets and a Viral 
Video, INSIDE WORLD FOOTBALL (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/world-
football/football-americas/concacaf-news/13639-city-boost-their-nycfc-presence-using-player-assets-
and-a-viral-video. 
144. E.g., Andy Clayton, Report: Barcelona Star Xavi the Prime Target for New York’s New MLS 
Franchise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/soccer/report-barcelona-star-
xavi-prime-target-nycfc-article-1.1579074 (last updated Jan. 15, 2014). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
MLS has seen stunning levels of growth since arriving on the scene in 
1996.145  Once, the league looked as if it would meet the same fate so many 
attempted leagues met before, but it has soldiered on.146  Part of that survival 
process was undoubtedly winning single entity antitrust immunity in the Fra-
ser decision.  That legal protection gave MLS wide latitude to control teams 
and players in order to achieve stable but competitive soccer.  Today though, 
that protection is no longer necessary.  MLS is now attracting the best Ameri-
can players as well as some very talented Europeans and the three Designated 
Player spots available to each team allow clubs to pay that talent an amount 
equal to what they deserve.  For the other players on the rosters though, a strict 
salary cap applies and serves to limit their earning capacity.  It is time to take 
the training wheels off MLS and allow the league to become a truly global op-
eration. 
 
                                                
145. E.g., Alex Morrell, After Flirting with Failure, Major League Soccer Popularity Now Surg-
ing, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexmorrell/2013/11/08/after-flirting-with-
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146. See id. 
